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Dreher: Agency

AGENCY
JAMES F.

DREHER*

The case of Cooper v. Graham' illustrates once again how
difficult it is for a gasoline distributor or an oil company
to show that as a matter of law the corner filling station operator is an independent contractor. The plaintiff was a
fourteen year old boy employed in a filling station operated
by the defendant Graham but owned by the defendant Beard
Oil Company. In cleaning out the grease pit, under instructions from Graham, gasoline fumes were ignited by a spark
from an electric outlet in the pit, and the plaintiff was
burned. The circuit judge granted a nonsuit as to Beard
on the ground that Graham was an independent contractor.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss, reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The only
evidence as to the relationship between Graham and Beard
was, of course, that presented by the plaintiff and consisted
only of a depiction of how the station was in fact operated.
The plaintiff was able to show, largely through the testimony of one of Graham's predecessors in the business, that
the station itself and all of its exterior equipment and appliances belonged to Beard, that Beard maintained all of the
equipment and did necessary repairs, that Beard required
that only Sinclair gasoline be sold at the station and fixed
the price for retail sale, and that Beard's agents collected
from Graham at the close of each day for the gasoline that
he had sold that day. These and other facts made it incumbent, in the Supreme Court's opinion, for a jury to pass upon
the question of whether Graham was an independent contractor within the standard test, quoted from Gomillion v.
Forsythe,2 that an independent contractor is one "who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece
of work according to his own methods, without being subject
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to the control of his employer except as to the result of his

work."
Mr. Justice Moss also held, although he did not separate
the two propositions as clearly as he might, that even were
Graham an independent contractor Beard could still be found
liable to the plaintiff because it had provided defective equipmont inherently dangerous for its intended purposes. In the
application of the law of independent contractor this is the
doctrine of "nondelegable duty" and is illustrated by such
South Carolina cases as Engelberg v. Prettyman.3
Another interesting point which the opinion in this case
makes is that when the plaintiff established that Graham
was in possession of a filling station belonging to Beard for
the purpose of selling oil products delivered to him by Beard,
a prima facie showing of a master-servant relationship was
made out, at least to the extent of requiring the defendant to
go forward with contrary proof. This holding would seem
to be a slightly extended application of the presumption, first
announced by our Court in Osteen v. S. C. Cotton Oil Co.,"
that "when one is found in possession of property of another,
using it in the service of the owner, he is presumed to be
the servant of the owner." It should be noted that in Watson
v. Kennedy5 the Court said in reference to this presumption
that the defendant's evidence could so completely destroy it
as to require the direction of a verdict. Mr. Justice Moss
does not say to the contrary, but refers to the presumption
merely as another reason why a nonsuit could not be granted
at the close of the plaintiff's case.
Lawlor v. Scheper,G if it receives publicity among the real
estate brokers, should lead to scrupulous care in representations made to accomplish a real estate sale. The defendant
brokers were held personally liable for incorrectly stating
to the plaintiff purchaser the balance due on two real estate
mortgages which the purchaser was to assume. The trial
court had directed a verdict in their favor for punitive damages, and there was no appeal by the plaintiff, so we may
assume that the representations were made in good faith and
upon information which the brokers believed to be accurate.
3.
4.
5.
6.

159
102
180
232

S.
S.
S.
S.

C. 91, 156
C. 146, 86
C. 543, 186
C. 94, 101

S.
S.
S.
S.

E.
E.
E.
E.

173 (1930).
202 (1915).
549 (1936).
2d 269 (1.57).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/4

2

1958]

Agency
SURVEY OF SOUTHDreher:
CAROLINA
LAW

They were still held liable, however, for the actual damages
which the plaintiff suffered by being responsible for $650.00
more of mortgage indebtedness than he had bargained for.
The brokers' reliance in the Supreme Court was upon the
rule that an agent is not personally liable on a contract if he
makes it within the scope of his authority for a disclosed
principal, 7 but Mr. Justice Oxner, who wrote the opinion,
pointed out that the rule has no application where, as here,
the agent is proceeded against in tort for an alleged false
representation made to induce a sale. It was said that even
though the brokers may have originally owed the prospective purchaser no duty to furnish information as to the
amounts due on the mortgages, they undertook to do so and
thereby took upon themselves the duty not to mislead the
purchaser. This duty was a personal one on their part, and
the resulting liability is personal.
During the review period the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided the agency points in a
slander case under South Carolina law and, although there
is nothing novel about the holdings, the case should be noted.
It is Tedder v. Merchants & Manufacturers Ins. Co.8 An insurance adjuster employed by the defendant to investigate a
fire loss on a crop of tobacco and the building in which it
was stored discovered in the course of his investigation that
the insured, a Mr. Brown, had a sharecropper on his tobacco
crop, that this sharecropper was the plaintiff, and that the
plaintiff had had a fire loss on his own home several years
before. The adjuster made a new investigation of that loss
although it had been with a different company and had been
paid. Brown called on the adjuster at his office in Sumter
to inquire as to why his claim had not been paid, and in the
course of the ensuing conversation the adjuster was alleged
to have made the slanderous utterances about the plaintiff.
He was quoted by Brown as saying that the defendant company had records proving that the plaintiff had burned his
home for the purpose of collecting insurance and that it had
proof that, on the loss being investigated, the plaintiff had
stolen the tobacco out of Brown's house and then burned
the building. He is further supposed to have said that the
7. Green v. Industrial Life & Health Ins. Co., 199 S. C. 262, 18 S. E.
2d 873 (1942).
8. 251 F. 2d 250 (4th Cir. 1958).
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defendant company would not pay Brown one penny on his
claim if the plaintiff was to share in it, and he advised Brown
to get rid of the plaintiff as a sharecropper because the
plaintiff was a known arsonist and bootlegger. At the time
of this conversation, as the Court of Appeals was later to
emphasize, Brown still had to sign a corrective proof of loss.
He did sign it and subsequently settled for one-half of his
original claim.
Judge Williams, who tried the case in the district court, denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict but after
the trial and a $4,000.00 verdict for the plaintiff, he granted
the defendant's motion for judgment non obstante veredicto
on the ground that the adjuster was not acting within the
scope of his authority when he made the alleged slanderous
remarks. The Court of Appeals, speaking through District
Judge Thompson of Virginia, reversed and held it *as an
issue for the jury as to whether the adjuster was acting
within the scope of his employment. The decision would seem
to be quite sound under the South Carolina cases relied upon
Johnson v. Life Ins. Co.0 and Mann v. Life & Casualty Ins.
Co.10 The court said that under the facts the jury would have
been justified in inferring'that the defamatory remarks were
made to influence Brown to settle for less than his original
claim and that, in any event, the business entrusted to the
adjuster by the defendant brought about the occasion for the
slanderous remarks. Under its view, the plaintiff's case was
thus brought within the requirements of the rule that to hold
a corporation liable for slander uttered by its agent it must
appear that the remarks were made "in the actual performance of th6 duties of the corporation touching the matter in
question."
The Court of Appeals also seems correct in its holding that
the cases relied upon by the defendant, Courtney v. American
Railway Express Co."' and Bosdel v. Dixie Stores Co.,' 2 were
inapplicable because in those cases it was not shown that the
agent was engaged in the defendant's business when the defamatory remarks were made and the remarks were made
concerning incidents which had occurred some time in the
past.
9.
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11.
12.

227
132
120
168

S. C. 351, 88 S. E. 2d 260 (1955).
S. C. 193, 129 S. E. 79 (1925).
S. C. 511, 113 S. E. 332, 24 A. L. R. 128 (1922).
S. C. 520, 167 S. E. 834 (1933).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/4

4

1958]

Dreher: Agency

SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

Another interesting agency point was made by the defendant in its claim that there was no publication of the defamation because Brown was acting as the plaintiff's agent in collecting the insurance and it was just as though the utterances
had been made directly to the plaintiff. The court overruled
this position also, pointing out that Brown was the only insured and was trying to collect the entire loss; that, although
the plaintiff might be entitled to a part of the proceeds of
the insurance for his sharecropper interest, Brown was acting in his own behalf in making the insurance collection; that
the plaintiff had not authorized Brown to act as his agent
in any capacity and did not even know that Brown had insurance. It was said that the sharecropper relationship in
itself did not constitute one party as the agent of the other,
citing Powers v. Wheless.13

13. 193 S. C. 364, 9 S. E. 2d 129 (1940).
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